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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-2965 c/w 20-2966 - SECTION “F”
NICHOLAS D’ARTAGNAN DUMAS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, ET AL
<p align="center">ORDER AND REASONS</p>
On the eve of the 2020 presidential election, the plaintiff
Nicholas D’Artagnan Dumas filed two election-related complaints in
this Court. [^1](#1) Among other impracticable remedies, Dumas “demand[s]”
the Court’s enjoinment of a national election in which nearly
100,000,000 Americans have already voted.
See ~ Katie Glueck, Early Votes Near 100 Million as Campaign Races to a Close, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020).
While Dumas’s pro se complaints are largely incomprehensible,
he appears to assert – in essence - that the actions of a broad
[1] Because they are substantively identical, the Court
consolidates both complaints for review here. The Court also
observes that both complaints are technically deficient – namely,
in their failure to bear a signature and failure to provide grounds
for a finding of in forma pauperis status. Regardless, in view of
the urgency of the plaintiffs’ complaints, which seek to enjoin an
election on election day, the Court disregards the complaints’
deficiencies and proceeds to rule as follows.
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array of American entities[^2](#2) have combined to disenfranchise
homeless individuals who lack a physical address.
Having conducted a prompt sua sponte review in light of the
urgency of Dumas’s requests, the Court finds that Dumas lacks
standing to pursue his claims in federal court.
<p align="center">I.</p>
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing”
standing to sue.
~ Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
“Over the years, [the Supreme Court’s] cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.”
~ Id. at 560.
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ – an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”
~ Id. (citations omitted).
“Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury has to be ‘fairly trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.”
~ Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 41–42 (1976)).
“Third, it must be
[2] Including departments of motor vehicles, the United States Postal Service, private financial institutions, the IRS, and the Federal Election Commission.
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‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”
~ Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
Even at the pleading stage, where
“general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice,”
Dumas’s complaints do not establish any of these
indispensable elements. See id.
<p align="center">A. Injury in Fact</p>
Dumas has not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury in fact.
Indeed, his complaints offer little to no allegations of tangible
harm he personally has suffered, but instead read more like
incomprehensible academic projects regarding loosely understood
“disenfranchisement of the American voter.” In his plea for
immediate injunctive relief, Dumas does not specifically identify
any
“actual or imminent”
injury he has suffered or may suffer as
a result of the defendants’ actions.
*~ See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)
(“The complainant must allege an injury to himself that is ‘distinct and palpable,’ as opposed to merely ‘[a]bstract.’”
~ (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (first quoting
~ Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975);
then quoting
~ O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974))).
<p align="center">B. Causation</p>
In a similar vein, Dumas does not state with any particularity
or precision how the collective actions of the diverse group of
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entities he has sued have caused any injury he has suffered.
Article III’s cases-or-controversies limitation
“requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.”
~ Simon, 426 U.S. at 41–42.
Here, Dumas’s complaints
fail to allege how his injuries can fairly be traced to the
challenged actions of the defendants.
Whatever the merits of Dumas’s causes of action, the Court is
constitutionally barred from rendering advisory opinions in
response to Dumas’s free-wheeling complaints – and, to the extent
his complaints might otherwise be justiciable, Dumas’s theory of
how the run-of-the-mill, presumably good faith, and well-accepted
practices of such a diverse set of institutions combine to
disenfranchise a broad swath of American citizens in a way that
has heretofore gone uncorrected by the people’s representatives is
fanciful and underdeveloped.
<p align="center">C. Redressability</p>
Likewise, it is unlikely that any injuries Dumas has alleged
are redressable by
“a properly framed judicial decree.”
~ See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 101 (7th ed. 2015).
For one, it is extremely doubtful that
a federal district judge may lawfully enjoin a constitutionally
mandated presidential election. Moreover, it is doubtful that any
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retroactive relief could redress Dumas’s disenfranchisement in
this year’s election.
* * *
“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”
~ Simon, 426 U.S. at 37.
Equally fundamental to our system of
government are the quadrennial national elections in which we elect
“a President of the United States of America.”
~ See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
With few exceptions, and for good reason, the
criteria for determining the manner in which eligible individuals
may participate in such elections is left to the political
processes of the various States.
In light of these structural imperatives, a federal court
must have a clear and clean rationale for intervening to disrupt
this vital state of affairs. Here, the plaintiff has urged the
Court to enjoin today’s presidential election in a haphazard
manner, and has not established his standing to do so.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that the plaintiff’s complaints
in the consolidated actions captioned above are DISMISSED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, November 3, 2020 ___
MARTIN L. C. FELDMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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